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this difficulty took the form of a modification of his original doctrine. He explained that the thing-in-itself was the will only in its relation to phenomena, and added: "The affirmation and negation of the will is a mere *Velle* and *Nolle*. The subject of them both is one and the same." Such a radical change in the conception of the will is fully expressed only in the letters, but Schopenhauer's later books also show a gradual approach to such an interpretation. At the same time the ideality of multiplicity and individuality are given up, and with the cessation of the absolute separation between the essence and manifestation of things, the essence or *Wesen* becomes immanent, where it has been transcendent. Side by side with this realistic modification of idealism, a change present in the other phases of Schopenhauer's thought no less than in the metaphysics, there is developed another difference of standpoint. Dogmatism is left behind, and in its final form Schopenhauer's philosophy ends with a question.

WELLS COLLEGE.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

Friedrich Nietzsche und seine Herrenmoral. Von M. KRONENBERG. München, C. H. Beck, 1901.—pp. 35.

Dr. Kronenberg's monograph is a reproduction of an address delivered before certain divisions of the German society for ethical culture. Notwithstanding the modifications that the work has undergone to prepare it for a reading public, the essential character of the pamphlet seems to have been determined by its original purpose. Dr. Kronenberg wished to present to the society Nietzsche's message, to tell them what significance his writings have for real life. The practical side of Nietzsche's doctrines receives most attention; and although in their investigation the writer shows great impartiality, he always assumes that the altruistic standpoint, at least in a modified form, is the standard with which Nietzsche's system must be compared before any judgment can be passed upon it. The question is really not so much the nature of Nietzsche's ethics in itself, as its agreement or disagreement with the tenets of the society for ethical culture. Such a treatment is inevitably somewhat narrow in scope, but that fact need not constitute an objection to it. In the present case, Nietzsche is treated so sympathetically, in spite of his final condemnation, that one can hardly fail to find the discussion suggestive.

Dr. Kronenberg regards Nietzsche's philosophy as the logical conclusion of egoism, which would be a possibility only if the individual existed for himself alone. Egoism is no less self-destructive, he says, than pure altruism. In reality every action includes both elements. Nietzsche's *Herrenmoral* contradicts itself, for as soon as egoism is taken seriously and affirms only itself, it at the same time makes impossible the conditions of its own existence. Nietzsche's estimate of the prevalent system of morality is vitiated by his failure to distinguish between origin and value. He did not realize that the two are not identical, that a historical account is not at the same time an evaluation, although it may be of great assistance in de-

termining the latter. Nietzsche's greatest ability, Dr. Kronenberg concludes, was shown in his keen insight into obscure mental factors, and his most valuable work was the analysis of the unconscious conditions that lie at the basis of moral phenomena.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

WELLS COLLEGE.

Saggio sulle idee morali e politiche di Tommaso Hobbes. Per GIUSEPPE TARANTINO. Napoli, Giannini & Figli, 1900.—pp. 144.

This book offers us a concise, but thoroughly adequate presentation and criticism of the leading doctrines in Hobbes's ethico-political system. The genesis of his philosophy and the influences determining it are treated with admirable clearness, and the enormous importance of Hobbes's work on the development of English ethical thought receives due emphasis. In agreement with Croom Robertson, the author rejects the notion that Hobbes was in any sort a disciple of Bacon, and lays stress on his affiliation to Galileo, to whom it is pointed out that he stood in a relation similar to that which Herbert Spencer holds to Darwin. In treating of Hobbes's ethics, Signor Tarantino argues with great force against the commonly received view that his moral system is a purely institutional one. He does not, he claims for him, make morality a function of politics, but politics a function of morality. The comparison made use of in this connection is most suggestive. "It is true that in a hundred places the author of the *Leviathan* reiterates that the criterion of morality resides in the will of the supreme power of the state, but this must be understood in a sense analogous to that of the statement of the church of Rome, when it affirms that the criterion of truth is placed in the supreme head of the Catholic hierarchy. Truth does not emanate from the reason, or from the arbitrary will of the Pontiff; it is outside of and above him, and the supreme hierarch has only the privilege of being its infallible interpreter." So, he continues, is it in Hobbes's theory, ethics is not an arbitrary creation of the sovereign power, nor are its laws merely conventional and temporary. The moral law gives the rational means of reaching that end to which by nature we tend; it issues from reason, which has recourse to the creation of a supreme civil power in order to render possible the realization of its own dictates. This clear recognition of the rationalistic element in Hobbes's thought is of value; it is a happy phrase that for Hobbes "Morality is the rationalization of Egoism." While full justice is done to his keen logical vigor, the criticism of the psychological premises on which his ethico-political conclusions rest is acute and searching. The book may be confidently recommended to those interested in the work of our first great English philosopher.

E. RITCHIE.

Die transscendentale und die psychologische Methode. Von MAX F. SCHELER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1900.—pp. 181.

A work on philosophical methodology is acceptable at the present time,